Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

Ronald Rex Ivie v. State of Utah, the Utah
Department of Health, and Sen. John William
Hickman and Rep. Stephen H. Urquhart : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David J. Holdworth; Attorney for Appellant.
M. Gay Taylor; Robert H. Rees; Office of Legislatve Research And General Counsel; Attorneys for
Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Ivie v. Utah, No. 20040071 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4773

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPlIIIII
RONALD REX IVIE,
plaintiff/appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
defendants,
and SEN. JOHN WILLIAM
HICKMAN and REP. STEPHEN H.
URQUHART,

BRffiF
SENATORJO
ANDRE
STEPHE

Cas<|i

APPELLEES
/ILLIAM HICKMAN
SENTATIVE
UROUHART

10040071-CA

defendants/appellees.

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD)
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTl|
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K.
David J. Holdsworth
9125 South Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C
Sandy, Utah 84070
(801) 352-7701
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant

:T COURT,
SANDY DEPARTMENT
RTON

M. Gay Tayl
I)
125)
Robert H. Ro
[SLATIVE
RESEARCH
OFFICE OF
COUNSEL
AND GENE:
Utah State Ca| I Complex
W210 Home ilding
tah 84114-5210
Salt Lake Ci
(801) 538-10:
Attorneys for fondants/appellees
Senator John lliam Hickman and
Representative ^ephen H. Urquhart
FILED
UffiAH APPELLATE COURTS

AUG 1 8 2004

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RONALD REX IVIE,
plaintiff/appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
defendants,
and SEN. JOHN WILLIAM
HICKMAN and REP. STEPHEN H.
URQUHART,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
SENATOR JOHN WILLIAM HICKMAN
AND REPRESENTATIVE
STEPHEN H. URQUHART

Case no. 20040071-CA

defendants/appellees.

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON

David J. Holdsworth
9125 South Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C
Sandy, Utah 84070
(801) 352-7701
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant

M. Gay Taylor (3205)
Robert H. Rees (4125)
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
AND GENERAL COUNSEL
Utah State Capitol Complex
W210 House Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5210
(801) 538-1032
Attorneys for defendants/appellees
Senator John William Hickman and
Representative Stephen H. Urquhart

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
Course of proceedings
Disposition in the court below
Statement of facts

2
2
3
3
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENT
7
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT BASED ON LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY WAS
PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
7
1.
Legislative immunity protects the legislative defendants from
liability arising from actions within the legitimate legislative
sphere.
7
2.
The legislative defendants' actions are within the legitimate
legislative sphere, making the legislative defendants immune
from suit. To the extent that the legislative defendants'
actions are outside the legitimate legislative sphere, they are
not actionable.
14
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE
LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER
UNDER UPPEA, AND PLAINTIFF HAS NO CLAIM UNDER THAT
ACT
16
CONCLUSION

19

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Bailey v. Bayles,
2002 UT 58 (Utah 2002)

16

Bogan v. Scott-Harris,
523 U.S. 44 (1998)

13,14

Coffin v. Coffin,
4 Mass. 1 (1808)

9

Consumers Educ. and Protective Ass'n v. Nolan,
368 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1977)

9

Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306 (1973)

11

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,
421 U.S. 491 (1975)

9,10, 11, 12

Fletcher v. Peck,
6 Cranch 87,130, 3 L.Ed. 162

12

Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606 (1972)

10

Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1881)

10, 12

Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate,
872 S.W.2d433 (Ky. 1993)

8

Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969)

9

Riddle v. Perry,
2002 UT 10 (Utah 2002)

7, 8

ii

State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives,
687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984)
Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951)

9
9,12,13, 14

Terra Utilities, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
575 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1978)

8

United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 178 (1966)

9

West v. Thomson Newspapers,
872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994)

1,3

Whalen v. Hanley,
63 P.3d 254 (Alaska 2003)

8

Wiggins v. Stuart,
671 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)

9

Yanero v. Davis,
65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001)

10

Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988)

17

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 6

7

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article V, Section 1

9,18

Article VI, Section 8

1,2, 6, 7

Article VIII, Section 5

1

iii

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004)

iv

1,2, 16, 17
1

Defendants and appellees Senator John William Hickman and Representative
Stephen H. Urquhart ("legislative defendants") submit this appellees* brief.
COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case under Article VIII, Section
5 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issues:
1.

Did the district court properly dismiss plaintiffs complaint because the
legislative defendants are absolutely immune from suit under the principle
of legislative immunity as expressed in the Speech or Debate Clause of
Utah Const, art. VI, § 8?

2.

Could the district court have likewise properly dismissed plaintiffs
complaint on the ground that the legislative defendants are not plaintiffs
employer under the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act ("UPPEA"),
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9, and that plaintiff, therefore, has no claim
under UPPEA against the legislative defendants?

Standard of appellate review: Whether a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted was properly granted is a question of law that the
appellate court reviews for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,
1004 (Utah 1994).

Citation to the record where the issue was preserved: The issues were the subject
of the legislative defendants' motion to dismiss, Record (hereafter MR.,f) at 83-85, and
supporting memorandum, R. at 52-57 and 60-61, plaintiffs memorandum opposing the
motion to dismiss, R. at 90-95 and 98-100, and the legislative defendants' reply
memorandum supporting their motion to dismiss, R. at 105-110.
PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE
Utah Constitution
Utah Const, art. VI, § 8:
. . . for words used in any speech or debate in either house, [Members of the
Legislature] shall not be questioned in any other place.
Statute
Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2(4):
(4)(a) "Employer" means the employing state agency or political
subdivision of the state.
(b) "Employer" includes an agent of an employer.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
This is an action under the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act ("UPPEA"),
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9, for damages resulting from the termination of
plaintiffs employment with the Utah Department of Health.

2

Course of proceedings
After plaintiff filed a verified complaint, R. at 1-15, the legislative defendants filed
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. R. at
83-85. The district court ruled on the legislative defendants' motion in a minute entry
dated September 23, 2003, R. at 114-120, and then entered an order on October 15, 2003,
dismissing plaintiffs complaint. R. at 121-122.
Plaintiff also named the State of Utah and the Utah Department of Health as
defendants. Plaintiffs complaint against those parties was dismissed by an order dated
December 15, 2003, R. at 136-137, pursuant to stipulation. R. at 131-132. Those
defendants are not involved in the present appeal.
Disposition in the court below
The district court entered an order on October 15, 2003, dismissing plaintiffs
complaint against the legislative defendants. R. at 121-122.
Statement of facts
An appellate court is required to accept as true all material allegations contained in
the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations.1 Based on that
standard, the facts of this case are as follows:
1. Plaintiff was an employee of the Utah Department of Health in the Division of
Epidemiology and Laboratory Services and the Bureau of Food Safety and Environmental

l

West, 872 ?2d at 1004.
3

Health from approximately 1990 to July 2003. Compl. % 2, 6, 7, and 18 (R. at 2, 3, and
6).
2. During 1991, plaintiff was assigned by his supervisor to conduct training with
local health department staff in the St. George and Cedar City areas and to assess the
public pool sanitation and safety program in those areas. Compl.fflf8 (R. at 3).
3. Plaintiff determined that the local health department was not enforcing
applicable state rules. He reported his findings to his supervisor. Complaint %s 9 and 10
(R. at 3-4).
4. Senator Hickman and Representative Urquhart are duly elected legislators
serving in the Utah Legislature. Senator Hickman represents Senate District 29 which, at
the time of the events referred to in plaintiffs complaint, covered Iron County and part of
Washington County. Representative Urquhart represents House district 75 which covers
part of Washington County. R. at 49.2
5. After plaintiff reported his findings to his supervisor, a constituent of Senator
Hickman and Representative Urquhart complained to them and argued that her swimming
pool should be exempt from state rules regulating public swimming pools. Senator
Hickman and Representative Urquhart contacted plaintiffs supervisors. They also asked
plaintiff to exempt pools operated by retirement communities from portions of the state

2

The district court took judicial notice of these facts pursuant to the legislative
defendants' request R. at 115.
4

rules and told plaintiff that if he did not comply, they would deal with the issue through
legislative action. CompL 1fl[ 11 and 12 (R. at 4).
6. On March 1, 2002, during the 2002 General Session of the Utah Legislature,
the Executive Appropriations Committee of the Utah Legislature met. Senator Hickman
was a member of that committee; Representative Urquhart was not. During the meeting,
Senator Poulton made a motion to reduce the General Fund for the Department of Health,
Epidemiology and Laboratory Services, Bureau of Food Safety and Environmental
Health, by $115,700, reflecting the elimination of two full-time positions, and to increase
funding by that same amount in favor of Medicaid breast and cervical cancer treatment.
The motion passed, with all but one of the 18 members present voting in favor. R. at 5051. 3 See also Complaint^ 13 (R. at 4).
7. The reduction in funding to the Department of Health, recommended by the
Executive Appropriations Committee, was reflected in Senate Bill 1, Appropriations Act,
sponsored by Senator Leonard Blackham. S.B. 1, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004).
S.B. 1 passed both houses of the Legislature on March 5,2002. The vote in the House
was 45 in favor, 27 opposed, and 3 absent. The vote in the Senate was 21 in favor, 4
opposed, and 4 absent Governor Leavitt signed S.B. 1 into law on March 26,2002. R. at
51. 4

3

See footnote 2, supra.

4

See footnote 2, supra.
5

8. In response to the Department of Health's budget reduction, plaintiffs job was
terminated. According to the facts alleged in plaintiffs complaint, the executive director
of the Department of Health was motivated to single out plaintiff for job termination due
to Senator Hickman's threat to push for future cuts in appropriations to the Department of
Health if the executive director did not comply. Compl ^f 15 (R. at 5).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In his complaint, plaintiff claims that actions of the legislative defendants led to
the termination of his job with the Utah Department of Health in violation of UPPEA.
The district court correctly concluded that those actions "were within the Legislative
Defendants power as legislators," Minute Entry, *§ 30 (R. at 118), and that the legislative
defendants "are absolutely immune from the acts alleged by Plaintiff." Id. That ruling is
correct and should be affirmed. The actions that plaintiff claims led to the termination of
his job were within the legitimate legislative sphere, making the legislative defendants
absolutely immune from liability under the principle of legislative immunity, as embodied
in the Speech or Debate Clause of Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution. Any of
their actions that may fall outside the legitimate legislative sphere did not cause the
termination of plaintiff s job and are not actionable. Furthermore, the district court order
of dismissal should be affirmed because the legislative defendants are not plaintiffs
employer, as defined in UPPEA, and plaintiff has no claim against the legislative
defendants under that act.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BASED
ON LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
The district court correctly ruled that the legislative defendants are protected from
liability for the claims asserted by plaintiff because of legislative immunity as reflected in
Utah's Speech or Debate Clause. Utah Const, art. VI, § 8. The district court's dismissal
of plaintiff s complaint is correct and should be affirmed.
1.

Legislative immunity protects the legislative defendants from liability
arising from actions within the legitimate legislative sphere.

Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution provides that "for words used in any
speech or debate in either house, [members of the Legislature] shall not be questioned in
any other place." This provision is almost identical to the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution of the United States found in Article I, Section 6 which provides that"... for
any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place."
The Utah Supreme Court discussed these two provisions in Riddle v. Perry. 2002
UT 10 (Utah 2002). In Riddle, plaintiff brought an action against a witness at a
legislative hearing for allegedly defamatory statements the witness made at the hearing.
In concluding that legislative immunity under Utah's Speech or Debate Clause shields the
witness from liability, the court cited and quoted approvingly cases decided by the United

7

States Supreme Court under the federal Speech or Debate Clause. Although Riddle is not
directly on point,5 it indicates that cases decided by the United States Supreme Court are
persuasive authority in interpreting the substantially similar Utah Speech or Debate
Clause.6 The legislative immunity cases decided under the federal Speech or Debate
Clause support the district court's dismissal in this case based on legislative immunity
under Utah's Speech or Debate Clause.
In interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution of the United
States, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that the Clause provides civil and
criminal immunity to legislative branch members engaged in activities within the
legitimate legislative sphere.7 Legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause is
5

Although not on point—and there are no Utah cases that are--Riddle supports
Speech or Debate Clause immunity for the legislative defendants in this case. If the
Speech or Debate Clause is broad enough to protect a witness at a legislative hearing, it is
broad enough to protect legislators performing a function at the core of their legislative
authority.
6

See also Terra Utilities, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 575 P.2d 1029,1033 (Utah
1978) ("Since the due process clause of our state Constitution (Article I, Section 7) is
substantially similar to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution,
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the federal due process clauses
are highly persuasive as to the application of that clause of our state Constitution.").
7

Cases from state courts have followed the reasoning and holdings of United States
Supreme Court decisions in interpreting their states' similar Speech or Debate Clauses.
See, e.g., Whalen v. Hartley, 63 P.3d 254,258 (Alaska 2003) (affirming dismissal of
action by a state employee against legislators who attached defamatory information to
committee minutes, stating that Alaska's legislative immunity provision is "patterned after
the federal speech or debate clause," and relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the scope of federal immunity); Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate, 872
S.W.2d 433, 440 (Ky. 1993) (holding that Kentucky's Speech or Debate Clause extends
8

an important safeguard of legislative independence within the framework of a separation
of powers. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975)
(The Clause serves the function "'of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately
established by the Founders.1") (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 178 (1966).8
Legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause ensures that "the legislative
function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently," id.,
leaving legislators "free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that
they will be later called to task in the courts for that representation." Powell v.
McCormack 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969). The protections of the Speech or Debate Clause
are secured "not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for
their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives
to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal."
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-374 (1951) (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1,

immunity to Senate members voting on executive apppointments, and stating that the
Clause applies to "every official act in the execution of legislative duties while in
session"); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan.
1984) (holding Kansas Legislature immune under Kansas Speech or Debate Clause from
an action challenging the constitutionality of a statute); Wiggins v. Stuart, 671 S.W.2d
262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming, on the basis of Kentucky's Speech or Debate Clause,
dismissal of declaratory judgment action against members of Kentucky General Assembly
challenging legislation upon which they acted); and Consumers Educ. and Protective
Ass'n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1977) (holding that the complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief against senator and president of the senate regarding confirmation vote of
appointee following alleged violation of Pennsylvania's "Sunshine Law" should have
been dismissed due to immunity provided by Pennsylvania's Speech or Debate Clause).
8

In Utah, the separation of powers concept is explicitly expressed in Article V,
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
9

27 (1808)). See also Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Ky. 2001) (stating that the
protections of the Speech or Debate Clause are secured "not to protect those individuals
from liability for their own unjustifiable conduct but to protect their offices against the
deterrent effect of a threat of suit alleging improper motives where there has been no
more than a .. . disagreement on the part of the complaining party with the decision
made.").
To achieve the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court has read the
Clause broadly. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, All U.S. at 501
("Without exception, our cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly to
effectuate its purposes."). Although the clause speaks in terms of "speech or debate," the
Court's
consistent approach has been that to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate
Clause to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view.
Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered; f[i]n
short,... things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it.' Rather than giving the clause a cramped
construction, the Court has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of freeing
the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to
control his conduct as a legislator.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617-618 (1972) (citation omitted) (quoting
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)).
The Clause protects against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions
brought by private individuals as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch.
Eastland, All U.S. at 503 ("The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is
10

supported by the absoluteness of the terms 'shall not be questioned,' and the sweep of the
term 'in any other Place.'"). It protects not onlyfromliability but alsofromthe burden of
defending a lawsuit, since even "a private civil action, whether for an injunction or
damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and
attentionfromtheir legislative tasks to defend the litigation." Id. at 503 (Whether a
criminal action is instituted by the executive branch or a civil action brought by private
parties, "judicial power is still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative
independence is imperiled.").
The critical inquiry in any Speech or Debate Clause case is whether the activities
complained of are within "the legitimate legislative sphere." Eastland, All U.S. at 503
("We reaffirm that once it is determined that Members are acting within the 'legitimate
legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference.") Thus,
for example, in Doe v. McMillan, All U.S. 306 (1973), the Court applied Speech or
Debate Clause immunity to bar an invasion of privacy action against members of a
Congressional committee who had authorized an investigation pursuant to which
allegedly objectionable materials violating plaintiffs' rights were gathered, introduced at
committee hearings, and reproduced in a report that was then published and distributed
upon the committee's authorization. The Court found those actions to be "legislative acts"
immunefromsuit. Id. at 312. The Court stated that members of Congress would be
immune from liability for actions within the legislative sphere "even though their

conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be
unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes." Id. at 312-313.9
A fundamental aspect of legislative immunity is that courts may not inquire into
the motives of legislators. In Tenney, 341 U.S. 367, 377, the plaintiff claimed that a
legislative hearing was not held for a legislative purpose but was designed to intimidate
and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising certain
constitutional rights, including the right of free speech and the right to petition the
Legislature for redress of grievances. In upholding legislative immunity in that case, the
Supreme Court stated:
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not
for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect
uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. The holding of this Court in
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,130, 3 L.Ed. 162, that it was not consonant with our
scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has
remained unquestioned....
In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed
to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such

9

See also Eastland, 421 U.S. 491 (stating that an action to enjoin implementation
of a subpoena issued by a Senate subcommittee must be dismissed since actions of
subcommittee members fell within the legitimate sphere and were protected by the
Speech or Debate Clause); Kilbourn, 103 U.S. 168 (affirming dismissal of action for false
imprisonment against members of a House committee who exceeded their authority by
requiring the plaintiff to testify involuntarily and against the speaker of the House for
issuing an arrest warrant upon plaintiffs refusal to testify).
12

controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for
discouraging or correcting such abuses.
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-378.
The principle that courts may not examine legislative motives is reiterated in
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998). In Bogan, the Supreme Court extended
legislative immunity to local legislators who introduced, voted for, and signed an
ordinance eliminating the government office held by the plaintiff who claimed that the
termination was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for
exercising her First Amendment rights. Echoing Tenney, the Court stated:
Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the
motive or intent of the official performing it. The privilege of absolute immunity
"would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives."
Furthermore, it simply is "not consonant with our scheme of government for a
court to inquire into the motives of legislators." . . .
This leave us with the question whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and
motive, petitioners1 actions were legislative. We have little trouble concluding that
they were
. . . The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating
the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city provides to its
constituents. Moreover, it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the
hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that
reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office.
Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55 (internal citations omitted).10

10

Similar to Tenney and Bogan, this case involves a claim that the legislative
defendants, in seeking a reduction in the appropriation to the Department of Health, were
13

The foregoing principles of legislative immunity under the federal Speech or
Debate Clause apply with equal force to legislative immunity under Utah's Speech or
Debate Clause. To the extent that the legislative defendants1 actions that gave rise to
plaintiffs alleged damages are within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, the
legislative defendants are immune from suit. Moreover, under Tenney and Bogan, a court
may not inquire into the motives of the legislative defendants for actions within the
legitimate legislative sphere.
2.

The legislative defendants' actions are within the legitimate legislative
sphere, making the legislative defendants immune from suit. To the extent
that the legislative defendants' actions are outside the legitimate legislative
sphere, they are not actionable.

Under the principles established in the cases discussed above, the critical question
in a case where legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause is asserted as a
defense is whether the activities complained of are within the legitimate legislative
sphere. If so, motives are irrelevant, and the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar
to suit.

improperly motivated by the legislative defendants' alleged desire to terminate plaintiffs
employment. Under Tenney and Bogan, even if plaintiff s allegations are true the
legislative defendants' motives are irrelevant. What matters is whether their actions are
within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. If so, then immunity applies. The
actions of considering appropriations for the various fiscal needs of the state and
adjusting those appropriations as the Legislature considers appropriate-as well as
considering future adjustments in appropriations-are core legislative activities. The
motives of legislators in making those determinations relating to appropriations are not a
legitimate area of judicial inquiry. The legislative defendants are shielded from
immunity for any claim arising from those activities.
14

In this case, plaintiff claims that the legislative defendants engineered a reduction
in the appropriation to the Department of Health so that plaintiffs job would be
terminated. The actions of the legislative defendants were part of the process the
Legislature goes through each year to appropriate public funds. Stripped of all
considerations of intent or motive, the actions of the legislative defendants are squarely
legislative. Because the activities of the legislative defendants are within the legitimate
legislative sphere, whether their actions were an attempt to target plaintiffs position for
elimination is irrelevant. The legislative defendants are immune from suit under the
Speech or Debate Clause, and the district court order dismissing this action should be
affirmed.
Plaintiff concedes that legislative immunity protects the legislative defendants
from liability for their actions within the legitimate legislative sphere.11 Plaintiff argues,
however, that some of the legislative defendants* actions were not within the legitimate
legislative sphere. He claims that the legislative defendants tried to interfere with
plaintiff s job performance and attempted to persuade plaintiffs boss to terminate his
employment.12 As the district court correctly pointed out, "even if the Legislative
n

Appellant's Opening Brief] at 13.

12

Under plaintiffs argument, a disgruntled swimming pool owner, for example,
who disagreed with the testing criteria used by plaintiff and complained to plaintiffs
supervisor, insisting that plaintiff be dismissed for overzealousness, would be subject to
liability for those actions if the supervisor actually decided that plaintiff should be
dismissed. The one responsible for the dismissal is not the disgruntled swimming pool
owner but the supervisor who made the independent determination to dismiss an
15

Defendants' threats were outside of the broad umbrella of protection [afforded by
legislative immunity], any threats made by the Legislative Defendants were more or less
true statements of their power as legislators. Plaintiff has failed to provide a legal basis
for how these threats are actionable." Minute Entry, % 30, n. 2 (R. at 118). That
conclusion of the district court is correct and should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS
ARE NOT PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER UNDER UPPEA,
AND PLAINTIFF HAS NO CLAIM UNDER THAT ACT13
The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act (UPPEA), Utah Code Ann. § 67-211 to -9, establishes a cause of action in favor of an employee whose employer takes
certain adverse action against the employee for engaging in certain "whistleblowing"
activities identified in § 67-21-3. The legislative defendants are not plaintiffs employer

employee. Similarly, in this case the legislative defendants did not maintain an employeremployee relationship with plaintiff. Plaintiff was an employee of the Department of
Health. The legislative defendants had no authority to exert direct influence on the
performance of plaintiff s job or to determine whether plaintiffs employment would or
would not continue. Even if they had tried to convince plaintiffs boss to terminate his
employment, his boss could have disregarded that input and exercised the prerogatives of
his position to decline to terminate plaintiffs employment. The decision to terminate
belonged exclusively to plaintiffs supervisor, notwithstanding any alleged effort on the
part of the legislative defendants to influence that decision.
13

The legislative defendants made this argument before the district court, but that
court based its dismissal only on legislative immunity and did not address the legislative
defendants' argument under UPPEA. Minute Entry, % 23 (R. at 117). This court may
nevertheless affirm the district court's order based on that argument. Bailey v. Bayles,
2002 UT 58 (Utah 2002).
16

and are not subject to liability for any alleged violation of the UPPEA. Plaintiffs
complaint alleging a violation of the UPPEA by the legislative defendants has no merit,
and the district court's dismissal of the complaint should be affirmed.
An "employer" under the UPPEA is defined as "the employing state agency or
political subdivision of the state." Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2(4)(a). "Employer" includes
"an agent of an employer." Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2(4)(b). As he states in his
complaint, plaintiff was at all times relevant to this action "employed with the Department
of Health." Complaint, % 6 (R. at 2). Plaintiff claims, however, that Senator Hickman
and Representative Urquhart are also his employer because they are "agents of the
employer." Complaint, f 3 (R. at 2).
For the court to determine that Senator Hickman and Representative Urquhart are
agents of the Department of Health, the plaintiff must show that they were acting on
behalf and subject to the control of the Department of Health. Zions First Nat'l Bank v.
Natl Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) ("A court canfindthat an agency
relationship exists only if the agent is shown to have been acting on behalf and subject to
the control of the principal."). It would be a monumental contortion of agency law to
conclude that Senator Hickman and Representative Urquhart, members of the legislative
branch, were acting on behalf and subject to the control of the Department of Health, an
executive branch department, when they took action to influence the Legislature to reduce

17

the Department of Health's budget.14 Indeed, plaintiff alleges just the opposite, that the
executive director of the Department of Health was acting under pressure from Senator
Hickman when he terminated plaintiffs employment. Comply \ 15 (R. at 5).
The legislative defendants are not agents of the Department of Health. They did
not become his employer simply by, as plaintiff alleges, attempting to influence plaintiffs
supervisor to terminate plaintiffs position. Plaintiffs complaint alleging a claim under
the UPPEA against the legislative defendants fails to state a claim against the legislative
defendants under UPPEA, and the district court's dismissal of the complaint was proper
and should be affirmed.

I4

The legislative defendants are constitutionally prohibited from acting as an agent
of the Department of Health under Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution which
states that "no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to [the
Legislative, Executive, or Judicial Departments of government] shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others
"
18

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellees hcuju,
Representative Stephen t l Uiqulmi i

^

• *• * *\e tuun io affirm the 1c

cutifi't) tmit'i dismissniy pi.lintiffs complaint
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of August, 2004.
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